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GEORGIA LAWREVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal class action lawsuits challenged the lawfulness of the
New York City Police Department's stop-and-frisk policy, resulting
in a district court finding in 2013 that police practices were
unconstitutional and must be remedied.' Public debate over the
efficacy of the city's stop-and-frisk policy did not end the following
year when the city dismissed its appeal, but became a topic in the
2016 presidential election.2  While many civic groups, public
officials, editorialists, and others chose sides in the years leading
up to the court's ruling, the city's district attorneys mostly stayed
on the sideline, playing virtually no visible role in the public
discussions before or during the lawsuits.
This Essay uses prosecutors' response to New York City's stop-
and-frisk policy as a lens through which to examine larger
questions about elected prosecutors' functions as public officials.
The Essay asks whether elected prosecutors, in the course of their
work, should formulate views on controverted public policy issues,
such as stop-and-frisk, about which they may have expertise and
perspectives. And if so, how can prosecutors' public policy
perspectives legitimately factor into their work, given the
functions they serve?
The Essay examines both prosecutors' core, traditional function
of processing criminal cases and three other functions that some
contemporary prosecutors serve-namely, providing legal advice to
the police, seeking to improve the law, and addressing criminal
law-related problems proactively in collaboration with the
community and other public agencies (i.e., "community
prosecution"). Given these functions, urban prosecutors would be
justified in responding to concerns about policing policies, such as
New York's pre-2014 stop-and-frisk policy. But the challenging
question is how prosecutors should best respond. The Essay
suggests that prosecutors might look to the community for its
input on what, if any, measures prosecutors should take. Further,
the Essay concludes by identifying a new function that prosecutors
1 See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, What Donald Trump Got Wrong on Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/nyregion/what-donald-trump-got-wro
ng-on-stop-and-frisk.html? r=0.
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might serve-namely, as intermediaries between interested public
agencies and civic and community groups, which represent
different interests and perspectives with regard to contested
questions of criminal process-related policy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF STOP-AND-FRISK AS A CRIME
CONTROL MEASURE
In Terry v. Ohio, stop-and-frisk was analyzed as a criminal
investigation practice. 3 A police officer stopped Terry and two
other men who allegedly were acting suspiciously; the officer
frisked them, found that two of them possessed guns, and arrested
them.4 The question for the trial court and, eventually, the U.S.
Supreme Court, was whether the guns were admissible as
evidence in a criminal prosecution.5 The Supreme Court rejected
Terry's Fourth Amendment challenge, concluding that the police
officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, which was
what the Fourth Amendment required to justify stopping the men,
and that the officer had reason to believe the men were armed and
dangerous, justifying a pat down for weapons.6
Over time in some U.S. cities, stop-and-frisk evolved from a
criminal investigative step in individual cases into a wholesale
crime control measure, designed to deter people from carrying
weapons and otherwise to discourage criminal activity.7 In cities
such as New York, Philadelphia, Newark, and Chicago, where class
actions were brought against policing policies, this allegedly meant
that the police would stop and question, or stop-and-frisk, many
people, not all of whom were genuinely acting suspiciously, and very
few of whom were carrying illegal weapons or otherwise engaged in
criminal conduct. But catching criminals was beside the point. The
392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
4 Id. at 1, 5-7.
6 Id. at 8.
6 Id. at 27-29.
7 See JefErey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship between the Constitutionality and
Effectiveness of New York City "Stop and Frisk," 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1519-20 (2014)
(describing the evolution of New York City's stop-and-frisk policies); MICHAEL D. WHITE &
HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLICING
TACTIC 113-14 (2016) (citing Bellin's history of the stop-and-frisk policies in New York City).
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very prospect that individuals in high-crime neighborhoods might
be stopped without giving the police a specific reason to suspect
them of wrongdoing was expected to deter them from carrying
weapons, thereby making the streets safer.8
Urban police departments' stop-and-frisk policies and practices,
as developed in the decades after Terry, have been a subject of
controversy and debate, especially in recent years. In New York
City, most prominently, class action lawsuits successfully
challenged the police practice based largely on statistical studies.9
In around 2003, the New York City police began stopping people in
public places by the hundreds of thousands annually, peaking at
8 WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 7, at 84-85 (discussing the emerging role of stop and
frisk in New York in the 1990s "as a tool in the NYPD efforts to seize guns and address
social disorder ... [and] as a central component of the department's targeted effort against
marijuana," and as a component of the department's "order-maintenance policing (OMP)"
policy, which involved "zero tolerance [for] social disorder"); id. at 92-93 (discussing the
"deterrence-based philosophy" justifying the use of stop-and-frisk); id. at 101 (quoting
statement attributed to New York City Police Commissioner Kelly, that minority youth
"'are less likely to carry weapons'" because they fear "'that they could be stopped and
frisked every time they leave their homes' ").
9 See Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (granting an
injunction against NYPD stops on constitutional grounds); Floyd v. City of New York, 959
F. Supp. 2d 540, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal dismissed (Sept. 25, 2013) (holding that
officers' stop and frisk of plaintiff without any objective basis violated the Fourth
Amendment); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(explaining why a permanent injunction against stop and frisk is an appropriate remedy);
see generally Bellin, supra note 7, at 1540 (describing the "special needs rubric" stop-and-
frisks must pass to be constitutional); Kaitlyn Fallon, Note, Stop and Frisk City: How the
NYPD Can Police Itself and Improve a Troubled Policy, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 321-22
(2013) (asserting that lower courts have eroded the force of the original Terry standard and
given police more power in stop and frisks); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Commentary, Stops and
Frisks, Race, and the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 1 (2013) (exploring
the history of class actions used to restrain the practice of stop-and-frisks); William A.
Margeson, Note, Bringing the Gavel Down on Stops and Frisks: The Equitable Regulation of
Police Power, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 739, 739-40 (2014) (asserting that class actions
involving stop-and-frisks showcase the need for greater regulation of police policies and
stop-and-frisks protocol); David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, Debate, The
Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 130
(2013) (discussing the role of Floyd in NYPD stop-and-frisk guidelines); Stephen Rushin,
Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3200-02 (2014)
(describing the history of private civil lawsuits related to stop-and-frisks); Brittany
Williams, Comment, Courts and the Political Process - How Activists Can Implement
Social Change, 58 How. L.J. 637, 641-43 (2015) (surveying New York City cases related to
stop-and-frisks); Civil Procedure - Class Actions - Southern District of New York Certifies
Class Action Against City Police for Suspicionless Stops and Frisks of Blacks and Latinos,
126 HARV. L. REV. 826, 827 (2013) (describing the effects of Floyd on NYPD stop-and-frisk
policy and procedure).
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685,724 stops in 2011.10 They rarely uncovered evidence of
criminal wrongdoing. In as many as 30% of the cases or more, the
police made no record of the encounter, although they were
required to do so as a result of prior litigation." A study by the
state attorney general found that 15% of the recorded stops were
unconstitutional because the police lacked reasoriable suspicion of
criminal conduct1 2 and that "Black and Hispanic citizens were
disproportionately targeted for stops at rates that could not be
explained by community demographics (racial makeup) or crime
levels." 1 3 Other statistical studies supported the conclusion that
the stop-and-frisk practices were racially discriminatory. 14
The practice was strongly defended by the New York City
police, its union, and Mayor Bloomberg's administration. 15 It was
opposed by civil liberties organizations, criminal defense
organizations, and some public officials, including Bill de Blasio,
the Democratic candidate who succeeded Bloomberg as mayor. 16
The state attorney general, which has civil rights enforcement
authority, also expressed concerns about racial and ethnic
discrimination. 17
Individual stops and frisks for investigative purposes are not
invariably unconstitutional or racially motivated, and police
policies regarding stop-and-frisk do not invariably foster
unconstitutional or undesirable police conduct.18 While the New
York City litigation was pending, some urged the city to make
10 See WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 7, at 91.
11 See id. at 89 (estimating that only 70% of stop-and-frisks were documented).
12 Id. at 99 (citing 1999 report).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 99-101, 103-04.
16 See Anil Kalhan, Stop and Frisk, Judicial Independence, and the Ironies of Improper
Appearances, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1043, 1062 (2014) (describing the Bloomberg
administration's "aggressive media campaign").
16 See id. at 1045 (stating de Blasio's position that stop-and-frisk practices had "become
excessive").
17 NYS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S
"STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM
THE OFFICE OF THE ATI'ORNEY GENERAL (1999), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfsfbur
eaus/civil-rights/stpjfrsk.pdf- see also NYS OFFICE OF THE ArrORNEY GENERAL, A REPORT
ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP-AND-FRISK
PRACTICES 4 (2013), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAGREPORTON_SQFPRACTICESNOV_20
13.pdf.
18 See WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 7, at 181, 185-86 (asserting that "[s]top and frisks
should not be used interchangeably with 'racial profiling' ").
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reforms to better satisfy constitutional concerns and avoid racial
disparities while meeting legitimate investigative needs. 19 After
the district court held the police policy to be unconstitutional, the
de Blasio administration withdrew the City's appeal in order to
participate in a joint remedial process involving a broad array of
stakeholders and overseen by a court-appointed mediator and to
develop reforms that would strike a better balance among
legitimate, competing interests.20
Employed as an urban crime control measure, however, stop-
and-frisk presents at least two legal problems. One is that the
Fourth Amendment does not permit random stops of pedestrians
in public places as a deterrent measure, the way it permits the
FAA to make air travelers go through a metal detector before
boarding a plane. The use of stop-and-frisk as a deterrent
presupposes that the police are likely to stop many people without
reasonable suspicion, which is to say, unconstitutionally and
therefore illegally. The second problem is that, in racially-mixed
urban communities, the practice encourages discriminatory
policing, particularly on racial and ethnic grounds. In New York
City, for example, young men of color in low-income neighborhoods
were disproportionately likely to be stopped and patted down.21
The legality of individual stops and frisks are rarely challenged
when they do not result in the discovery of a gun or other evidence
and lead to an arrest. Young people of color in low-income
neighborhoods who are stopped illegally have no realistic means of
individual redress, since they lack the resources and incentive to
bring individual lawsuits arguing that their Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. In New York City, the practice was not
brought into sharp relief until the Center for Constitutional Rights
and others challenged it in class action lawsuits. The plaintiffs
19 See, e.g., NY CITY BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON THE NYPD's STOP-AND-FRISK POLICY 2 (2013),
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072495-StopFriskReport.pdf.
20 See CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, Joint Remedial Process in Floyd v. City of
New York: What You Need to Know, https://ccrjustice.org[home/get-involved/tools-resource
s/fact-sheets-and-faqs/timeline-floyd-v-city-new-york (last updated Jan. 18, 2017) (stating
that the purpose of the Joint Remedial Process is to develop reform with the input of those
affected by the policies).
21 See WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 7, at 99 ("Research clearly demonstrates that [stop
and frisk] tactics employed by the NYPD have disproportionately targeted minority citizens
in mostly poor neighborhoods.").
1184 [Vol. 51:1179
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could not win simply by showing the police happened to make
thousands of stops without any legal basis or that reflected racial
bias, but had to show that this was a result of city policy. 22
Broader debates over policing policy are not strictly limited to
the question of their legality, however.23 In New York City, there
was disagreement about whether stop-and-frisk practices are
effective. Some gave them partial credit for the city's declining
crime rates, 24 while others thought their impact on crime rates
was trivial.25 There was also disagreement about whether the
practice is necessary to ensure police safety as well as about
whether any benefits justified costs to individuals and
communities. Many who were stopped for no good reason and who
perceived that they were racially targeted came to mistrust or
resent the police. 26 Throughout low-income minority communities,
the practice undermined trust in police, law enforcement and
government in general-which, of course, made the work of law
enforcement more difficult. 27 As the district court found in the
New York City litigation:
[Ijit is important to recognize the human toll of
unconstitutional stops. While it is true that any one
stop is a limited intrusion in duration and deprivation
of liberty, each stop is also a demeaning and
humiliating experience. No one should live in fear of
being stopped whenever he leaves his home to go about
the activities of daily life. Those who are routinely
subjected to stops are overwhelmingly people of color,
22 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ('in order to hold
a municipality liable for the violation of a constitutional right, plaintiffs 'must prove that
"action pursuant to official municipal policy" caused the alleged constitutional injury.' ").
23 See WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 7, at 82 ("The confluence of media coverage, legal
proceedings, and public opinion related to stop and frisk has resulted in the strategy
becoming one of the most controversial and contested topics in the United States.").
24 See id. at 81, 95 (quoting former NYC police commissioner and police spokesman); id.
at 93-94, 97 (citing studies).
25 See id. at 82, 94-96.
26 Id. at 109-10 (summarizing Vera Institute of Justice study); id. at 110-11 (summarizing
the Center for Constitutional Rights study).
27 Id. at 109 ("Several studies have found that as a result of the disparate treatment of
racial and ethnic minorities in New York, minority youth in New York City distrust the
police, feel uneasy when they see the police, and view contact with the police as negative
and adversarial.").
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and they are justifiably troubled to be singled out
when many of them have done nothing to attract the
unwanted attention. Some plaintiffs testified that
stops make them feel unwelcome in some parts of the
City, and distrustful of the police. This alienation
cannot be good for the police, the community, or its
leaders. Fostering trust and confidence between the
police and the community would be an improvement
for everyone. 28
At the same time, the court recognized that it lacked authority to
adjudicate the wisdom of stop-and-frisk practices. 29
While the New York City litigation progressed, commentators
and public officials chose sides in the media and in other public
fora. One might have expected the elected district attorneys, as
the chief elected criminal-law enforcement officers of New York
City's five counties, to have a voice in the debates. But they were
virtually silent.30
B. PROSECUTORS' RESPONSE TO PROBLEMATIC STOP-AND-FRISK
PRACTICES
Suppose that, before or during the New York City class action
litigation, an elected district attorney in the city-perhaps one
seeking to be regarded as a progressive prosecutor 31 -concluded
that the city's police were engaged in illegal or unwise stop-and-
28 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
29 Id. at 556 ("This Court's mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police
behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool.").
so In 2012, before the district court ruled, challengers seeking the Democratic nomination
for Kings County District Attorney criticized the incumbent, Charles Hynes, for acceding to
the police department's stop-and-frisk practices. See Mosi Secret, Brooklyn District Attorney
Has a New Rival, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/nyreg
ion/charles-hynes-faces-re-election-fight-from-lawyer-in-strauss-kahn-case.html. Manhattan
District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr. publicly criticized the police policy after the District Court
ruled it to be unconstitutional in 2013. See Daniel Prendergast & Jamie Schram, Manhattan
DA Knocks NYPD's Stop-Frisk, N.Y. POST (Sept. 24, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/09/24/man
hattan-da-rips-nypds-stop-frisk-will-prosecute-abuse/.
31 See, e.g., Editorial Board, A Wiser Generation of Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/opinion/a-wiser-generation-of-prosecutors.html?_r=0
(discussing the contemporary importance of "[r]eformist prosecutors" who are rethinking
criminal prosecution, such as those declining to seek the death penalty and steering
nonviolent offenders into treatment programs).
[Vol. 51:11791186
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frisk practices. Or suppose that, hearing the concerns of the
community, the prosecutor perceived a need to address the erosion
of public trust that the practices caused. How, if at all, should the
prosecutor respond? Is there a role for a prosecutor to play in the
contemporary public policy debate over stop-and-frisk, and if so,
what might that role be?
Until the district court ruled, the city's prosecutors took no
public position on the challenged policy and practice. The only
apparent reaction on the part of any of them came from Bronx
District Attorney Robert Johnson, and it was somewhat oblique.
In September 2012, while the class action challenges were
pending, Johnson's office announced that it would no longer
prosecute individuals arrested for trespassing in public housing
unless the arresting officer personally justified the arrest. 32 The
office did not publicly explain its motivation and did not explicitly
connect the new policy to the police department's stop-and-frisk
practices. However, it could be inferred that the prosecutor's
announcement was animated by concern that minorities were
unfairly and disproportionately targeted for stops that preceded
trespassing arrests and by a desire to retain the trust of a
constituency with a large low-income, minority population. It is
unclear why the other prosecutors did not respond and why
Johnson did not respond more explicitly-whether they hesitated
out of political concern or to avoid straining their relationship with
the police, they thought it was beyond their authority or expertise
to respond, or they were busy with other things.
The question of how prosecutors might have responded is less
about stop-and-frisk per se than about prosecutors' role as public
officials in relation to public policy debates-for example, in
making prosecutorial decisions based on public policy preferences,
or in seeking to influence the development of the law and the work
of other government agencies. Whether prosecutors as public
officials should take a stance on public policy questions or instead
simply stick to prosecuting crimes, is a question of increasing
currency and academic interest. Some assume that prosecutors
32 Graham Rayman, Robert Johnson, Bronx DA, to NYPD: No More Frivolous Stop and
Frisk Trespassing Arrests, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.villagevoice.com/
news/robert-johnson-bronx-da-to-nypd-no-more-frivolous-stop-and-frisk-trespassing-arrests-6
684033.
1187
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
should play a restrained role with regard to regulatory issues or
other public-policy issues outside their traditional authority and
expertise. For example, Jennifer Arlen has criticized white-collar
prosecutors for venturing into questions of corporate internal
governance by using their leverage to compel corporations to
implement internal reforms, arguing that it is inconsistent with
rule-of-law principles for prosecutors to use their authority to
influence internal corporate regulation. 33 In contrast, Angela
Davis and others favor a broader prosecutorial role in relation to
public policy when they urge prosecutors to take account of
excessive incarceration rates in making charging and plea
bargaining decisions. 34
Police stop-and-frisk policy presents an interesting question
about elected prosecutors' role and responsibilities with regard to
questions of public policy. There is room to debate whether these
prosecutors should take a view of whether the police in their
jurisdiction are employing stop-and-frisk in illegal and
discriminatory fashion and, even if not, whether the impact on
community relations with the police casts doubt on whether the
practice is presently well employed. Assuming this is a proper
subject of prosecutors' concern, it is also uncertain how prosecutors
troubled by policing practices can express their concerns most
appropriately and effectively. The following Parts of this Essay
explore these questions.
III. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN CASE PROCESSING
A. PROSECUTORS' CORE ROLE AS CASE PROCESSORS
The principal objective of a prosecutor's office "is to ensure the
efficient and effective prosecution or disposition of cases presented
for the prosecution," and some offices may view this as the limit of
33 Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed
Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 203 (2016), http://pape
rs.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2767065.
3 Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1063, 1064-65 (2016).
1188 [Vol. 51:1179
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their responsibilities. 35 Prosecutors' core task, in this view, is to
investigate and prosecute criminal cases, which includes making
discretionary decisions about whether to bring charges, how to
present their cases in court, and what plea bargains to make and
sentences to seek. Prosecutors traditionally make these
discretionary decisions in light of the law, the purposes of criminal
punishment e.g., promoting public safety by incapacitating
dangerous offenders and deterring future crime-and in light of
other public interests related to criminal law enforcement-e.g.,
protecting victims, witnesses, and communities, gathering
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and conserving resources. In
making discretionary decisions, prosecutors are not supposed to
simply pile up convictions or seek the harshest punishment for
offenders but are expected to "seek justice," which includes
avoiding the conviction of innocent people, affording criminal
defendants a fair process, and seeking proportional punishment. 36
If one takes a narrow view of prosecutors' case-processing
function, then even when considerations of social policy seem
relevant to individual decisions, prosecutors might be obligated to
ignore them. The idea is that a prosecutor must investigate,
evaluate and prosecute cases in a nonpartisan manner, 37 and that
prosecutors' views regarding public policy other than criminal
justice policy are irrelevant in doing so.38 Prosecutors sometimes
35 Catherine M. Coles, Evolving Strategies in 20th-Century American Prosecution, in THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 177, 184 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine
Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008).
36 See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice'?, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607 (1999) (discussing the basis of prosecutors' duty to act in the interests of
justice). The function of processing criminal cases has its evident complexities. Many have
noted the tension, in performing this function, between prosecutors' role as advocates or
"adversarial lawyers" and their role as (ideally) disinterested administrators of criminal
law. See, e.g., Eric Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2643065##.
37 See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 837 (arguing that prosecutors should remain neutral when making discretionary
decisions).
38 This view of prosecutorial nonpartisanship was suggested by then-Attorney General
Robert Jackson in his iconic speech to the U.S. Attorneys:
In spite of the temptation to divert our power to local conditions where they
have become offensive to our sense of decency, the only long-term policy
that will save federal justice from being discredited by entanglements with
local politics is that it confine itself to strict and impartial enforcement of
federal law, letting the chips fall in the community where they may. Just
2017] 1189
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
convey this narrow conception of their role when they purport to
do nothing more than "follow the evidence" or "follow the facts"
wherever they lead.39 To the extent prosecutors take account of
social consequences, and not simply evidence of guilt or innocence,
one might argue that they are deviating from their role as trial
lawyers for the state or as ministers of justice (with emphasis on
the ministerial).
This conception is reinforced by separation-of-powers
considerations. One may argue that prosecutors lack legal
authority to formulate and implement immigration policy,
corporate regulatory policy, and other civil policy, and that using
criminal power to achieve civil ends would be an abuse of
authority. Government power is divided up among different
government agencies at different levels. The federal government
decides questions of foreign policy and others on which state and
local governments have no role. Within state and local
governments, agencies other than prosecutors' offices address
questions of family welfare, mental health, and a host of others.
Prosecutors should not try to influence, or take account of, non-
criminal public policy that is entrusted to other branches of
government or other agencies. Further, prosecutors lack expertise
in formulating and implementing public policy outside criminal
justice, and attempting to do so would lead to mistakes and
abuses. Prosecutors may be selected for their trial skills,
administrative abilities, political leadership or connections, but
they are rarely selected based on civil policy expertise. Therefore,
as there should be no permitting of local considerations to stop federal
enforcement, so there should be no striving to enlarge our power over local
affairs and no use of federal prosecutions to exert an indirect influence that
would be unlawful if exerted directly.
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 18, 20 (1940).
39 Press Release, Office of the Dist. Attorney Risa Vetri Ferman, Montgomery County,
Cosby Charged With Aggravated Indecent Assault, Dec. 30, 2015, http://www.montcopa.org/
ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/2730; Ruth Marcus, No Swift Blessing for Meese Regulation,
WASH. POST, Aug 15, 1988 (quoting Attorney General Thornburgh regarding the need for an
independent prosecutor to investigate crimes by members of Congress: "we will follow the
evidence wherever it leads, no matter who's involved, if there is a violation of federal
criminal law involved"); John Mintz & Marc Fisher, D.C. Probe's Familiar Pattern is Laced
With Issue of Race, WASH. POST, June 7, 1987 (quoting U.S. Department of Justice
spokesman: "We go after criminal cases and follow the facts wherever they lead. . . . We
don't look at the color, race or national origin of the defendant.").
[Vol. 51:11791190
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as executive branch officials, they should constrain themselves to
executing the criminal law.
On this view, prosecutors have no business worrying about the
overwhelming majority of stops and frisks-namely, those that
have nothing to do with a criminal case. Prosecutors do not have a
role or expertise in policing. Prosecutors work with the police in
the context of individual investigations and prosecutions, but
much police work has little if anything to do with criminal
prosecutions. Prosecutors do not oversee the police and so cannot
tell the police how to do their jobs. Prosecutors' principal
responsibilities relate to processing criminal cases-for example,
ensuring that inculpatory evidence is gathered lawfully, so that it
is admissible in court; that criminal investigations are thorough, to
reliably separate the guilty from the innocent; and that evidence is
preserved so that it can be used in assessing guilt or innocence,
offered in evidence, and disclosed to the defense as required by law
or as otherwise appropriate. To the extent police use a stop-and-
frisk strategy for crime control, not for a criminal investigation, it
is outside prosecutors' area of responsibility and expertise.
B. QUESTIONS OF LEGALITY IN INDIVIDUAL CASES
Even on the narrow view of prosecutors' role as individual case
processors, police stop-and-frisk practices may be relevant to
prosecutors' work in either of two situations-first, where there is
evidence that a particular police officer conducted a stop or frisk
that was not merely unconstitutional but criminal; and second,
where evidence relevant to a criminal prosecution resulted from an
arguably illegal stop or frisk. In these scenarios, the prosecutor
might form a view about whether particular police conduct was
criminal or unconstitutional. It does not follow, however, that the
prosecutor would need to formulate and implement a view of
whether the police department's underlying stop-and-frisk policy is
a sound or lawful one.
1. Prosecuting Police for Criminal Stops and Frisks.
Prosecutors have authority to prosecute crimes by the police-as
we know from recent cases involving police shootings of civilians.
And New York City prosecutors do occasionally bring criminal
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charges against police officers. 4 0  In theory, prosecutors can
initiate investigations and criminal prosecutions against police
officers who execute a stop or frisk in a criminal manner. For
example, one can imagine prosecutors bringing assault or
kidnapping charges in extreme cases where a police officer
conducted a stop and frisk without any arguable justification or
with excessive force.
It is unclear whether evidence to justify prosecuting a New
York City police officer for conducting a stop-and-frisk came to
prosecutors' attention during the period when the police practices
were in dispute.41  The police were unlikely to initiate
investigations of their own conduct. Victims might also have been
reluctant to complain to prosecutors. 42 But if prosecutors saw such
evidence, they would have been expected to put aside their
sympathies for the police and their self-interest in maintaining
good relationships with the police, 43 in order to follow the evidence
wherever it led.
But that said, prosecuting individual police officers in extreme
cases, even if the cases presented themselves, would not be an
appropriate way for a prosecutor to express a concern over police
stop-and-frisk policy. Isolated prosecutions would have implied
that wrongful stops-and-frisks were aberrational, not a systemic
problem. Prosecutions of extreme wrongdoing would not have
addressed the core concern about stop-and-frisk in New York City,
40 E.g., Rick Rojas, Two N.YP.C. Officers Are Charged With Lying About a Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2017, at A24.
41 The Manhattan District Attorney reportedly prosecuted police officers for perjury for
lying under oath about the circumstances of a stop-and-frisk. See Prendergast & Schram,
supra note 30. But I am unaware of cases where New York City police were charged with a
crime in conducting a stop or frisk.
42 In New York, the Civilian Complaint Review Board receives and reviews complaints by
civilians against the police and, in appropriate cases, might bring evidence of police
wrongdoing to prosecutors' attention. Reportedly, allegations of illegal stops-and-frisks are
not a high priority for the agency, because it receives many allegations of more serious
police misconduct. See Matt Sledge, NYPD Oversight Chair Considers Punting on Stop-
and-Frisk, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 7, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/05/nyp
d-oversight-stop-and-frisk-n_5652759.html.
4 Whether prosecutors can in fact investigate police disinterestedly has been much
debated in cases involving police shootings of civilians. See Kate Levine, Who Shouldn't
Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (2016) (arguing that a conflict of interest exists
when local prosecutors lead cases against the police); see also Bruce A. Green & Rebecca
Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors' Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463 466-67 (2017)
(identifying prosecutorial conflicts of interest as the source of misconduct and abuse).
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which was that its everyday use as a crime control measure fosters
unconstitutional and race-based intrusions into individuals'
autonomy, leading to community resentment and mistrust.
Further, it would be an abuse of prosecutorial power for
prosecutors to bring charges against individual street-level police
officers for the avowed purpose of expressing displeasure with
policing policies that may or may not have contributed to the police
misconduct and that were adopted by higher-ups in the police
department with the approval of the city's lawyers.
2. Prosecuting Civilians Based on Illegal Stops and Frisks.
Prosecutors may also have examined police conduct in individual
cases brought against civilian defendants when a stop-and-frisk
led to the defendant's arrest. But, for various reasons, prosecutors
were unlikely to look probingly at police stop-and-frisk policy in
this context.
In their daily professional work, urban prosecutors ordinarily
encounter a police stop-and-frisk only when it leads to the
discovery of evidence and to an arrest. When stop-and-frisk is a
crime control measure, this is a small minority of cases and they
are unrepresentative. Even when a case involving a stop-and-frisk
comes to a prosecutor, the prosecutor may never investigate the
lawfulness of the police conduct, since cases are often resolved by a
plea bargain before suppression motions are filed. On rare
occasions when the defense challenges the legality of the stop, the
prosecutor will likely perceive that the prosecutor's office has a
responsibility to defend the police conduct if there are plausible
legal and factual grounds to do so-for example, by arguing that
the officer had "reasonable suspicion" to justify the initial stop,
and that the initial deprivation of liberty was not so significant as
to amount to an arrest requiring "probable cause." As an advocate,
the prosecutor will tend to credit the officer's account of the facts
and put the most positive spin on the facts and the law. In other
words, the prosecutor will become an advocate for the particular
stop-and-frisk, not a detached observer, analyst, or critic.
Moreover, in most cases, if a plea bargain does not end the case,
the judge will ultimately uphold the police conduct. Although the
fact that the police uncovered evidence is legally and logically
irrelevant to the lawfulness of the initial stop, the discovery of
evidence may influence the judge's thinking, if only unconsciously,
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regarding the reasonableness of the avowed suspicion that led the
officer to act.
Based on the cases that come through the prosecutor's door,
police stop-and-frisk policies may seem unobjectionable. In the
trial prosecutor's experience, the practices lead to the discovery of
criminal conduct and evidence of a crime and, as verified by
judges' rulings, the practices are ordinarily lawful. The elected
chief prosecutor may have no reason to see things differently.
Cases involving a stop-and-frisk will be easy to ignore, since these
are unlikely to be the most significant cases in the office. There
may be no way or reason to accumulate the office's knowledge
about these cases. But even if district attorneys look at these
cases, they may not perceive a problem. They will see a collection
of cases in which prosecutors in the office plausibly argued that
the stops were reasonable; police officers' avowed suspicions were
confirmed by the discovery of evidence; and the legality of the
police conduct, if challenged, was usually upheld by the court.
The district attorney will only be concerned about stop-and-
frisk based on an understanding of what occurs on the streets
rather than in the courthouse-for example, by speaking with
people in the community and civic and defense representatives or
from reading studies and reports about the problem. But even if a
progressive prosecutor concludes that police stop-and-frisk
practices involve racial profiling and unjustified encroachments on
individuals' liberty, there might still be no occasion to comment or
otherwise respond professionally in the context of individual
criminal prosecutions. At least from the perspective of the
prosecutor who takes a narrow view of the prosecutorial role, this
is someone else's problem. For the most part, this appears to have
been the reaction of New York City prosecutors, with the exception
of the Bronx prosecutor, who determined to look at certain
trespassing cases more closely, presumably to ensure the
sufficiency of the evidence of criminal wrongdoing and the
lawfulness of the underlying police conduct.4
One can imagine a progressive prosecutor adopting a more
impactful policy in response to the office's general skepticism about
the lawfulness of police stop-and-frisk practices and the credibility
44 See supra pp. 1186-1187.
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of the justifications given by police when they engaged in this
practice. 45 For example, the office might adopt a policy of closely
scrutinizing every case that began with a stop or frisk and declining
to go forward unless the office was satisfied that the police conduct
was lawful. One might wonder whether closer scrutiny would be
useful, however, or whether prosecutors would simply be burdening
themselves, with little impact on policing practices of which they
are skeptical. In theory, one might want prosecutors to scrutinize
all cases that the police bring them to ensure that the defendant is
guilty and that the case can be proven based exclusively on legally
admissible evidence. But in the urban setting, where there is a high
volume of cases, prosecutors take shortcuts, especially in
misdemeanor and violation cases that can be resolved quickly and
with minimal effort. Devoting greater prosecutorial time to low-
level cases that began with a police stop would mean devoting less
prosecutorial time to other, potentially more serious cases. If the
objective were simply to ensure the integrity of these particular
prosecutions and not to make a bigger point, the policies might
seem to involve a misallocation of resources.
Even more boldly, a prosecutor might refuse to go forward with
any case in which evidence was procured by an on-the-street stop-
and-frisk. This would be less time-consuming to administer, but
this approach would seem to paint with too broad a brush.
Especially in cases of serious wrongdoing, this approach would
seem to overvalue the interest in deterring police misconduct at
the expense of the public interest in enforcing the criminal law.
Further, this categorical approach would deny police officers the
opportunity to show to the prosecutors' satisfaction that their
policing conduct was lawful and justified. Finally, this approach
would be contrary to how prosecutors ordinarily handle cases,
which is to examine them individually to determine the sufficiency
and admissibility of the evidence, not to rely on presuppositions
about whether evidence was lawfully obtained.
4 This would not have been the first time there was skepticism about explanations given
by the police of their on-the-street encounters with civilians. See, e.g., People v. McMurty,
314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195-96 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (discussing "dropsy" cases).
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C. THE RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL POLICY TO CASE PROCESSING
One might argue that even if prosecutors adopt a narrow, case-
processing role, they cannot be indifferent to, or agnostic about,
social policy. Prosecution occurs in a broader social context.
Considerations of social policy-even those that may seem initially
remote from criminal justice-matter to prosecutors' work, both
because social policy has implications for the exercise of discretion
and because the exercise of discretion has implications for social
policy.
First, considerations of public policy are relevant to decisions
regarding whether criminal charges are necessary or whether
wrongdoing can be adequately deterred and punished through civil
sanctions or by other means. While some decisions, such as
whether to prosecute a low-level tax evader, might be resolved
without regard to the broader social context, judgments about
social welfare policy are often relevant to questions of deterrence
and retribution. For example, where vagrancy is the result of
poverty or homelessness, a prosecutor must determine whether
the state should respond through criminal prosecutions or whether
social welfare programs that address the underlying causes will
better serve societal ends. While the police might view vagrancy
as a criminal justice problem warranting the use of arrest power, a
prosecutor may conclude otherwise.
Likewise, where a criminal offense was a product of the
offender's mental illness or imprisonment will exacerbate the
prisoner's mental illness, the prosecutor must consider whether
the state should address the conduct as a criminal problem or a
mental health problem. The creation of mental health courts,
veterans courts, and drug courts reflects an understanding that
prosecution and imprisonment often are not the appropriate
government response-that mental illnesses, including drug
addiction, are often better addressed as mental health problems
even if they involve criminal conduct. Given the prevalence of
mental illness among offenders, a responsible prosecutor must
invariably formulate views about mental health policy and the
appropriate role of leniency as part of a sensible government
response to problems of mental illness. This is not extraneous to
what prosecutors do, but goes to its core. Whether it is fair to
punish a particular person who was driven by mental illness to
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commit a crime, given principles of deterrence and proportionality,
and whether rehabilitation and public safety are best served by
incapacitating that person in prison, are questions about criminal
justice, albeit questions that are informed by a broader
understanding of mental health policy.
To give another example: In deciding whether to bring charges
against non-citizens and what charges to bring, prosecutors cannot
ignore immigration policy, even if immigration is, in some
respects, a uniquely federal concern. 46  Prosecutors are not
expected to bring all charges that the evidence supports. Among
the relevant considerations are "the impact of prosecution or non-
prosecution on the public welfare" and "whether the authorized or
likely punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate
in relation to the particular offense or the offender." 47 With regard
to non-citizens, prosecutors might fairly consider whether a
prosecution could result in deportation and, if so, whether that
would be an unduly harsh punishment for the offender and have
negative consequences for the offender's family and community.
Whether a prosecutor gives weight to these concerns, and how
much weight she gives, almost invariably will be affected by the
prosecutor's general views of immigration policy--e.g., the
legitimacy and importance of deporting non-citizen offenders.
Second, in exercising discretion, it is sometimes legitimate, if
not essential, to consider public policy implications. Prosecutions
have impacts that are not necessarily intended,4 8 including
broader community and social impacts. While it is generally
agreed that prosecutors should not use their power for partisan
political ends and while it is true that different political parties
often take different perspectives on questions of social policy, it
does not necessarily follow that, in order to stay neutral,
46 See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L.
REV. 245, 265 (2016) (arguing that discretionary decisions by prosecutors are central to
deportation issues).
47 AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 3-4.4 (4th ed. 2015).
4 This was much discussed with regard to the 2016 presidential campaign, when it was
noted that federal prosecutorial policy required prosecutors to avoid conduct that might
influence an imminent election. See, e.g., Linda Qiu, Clinton campaign says Comey letter
violates Justice Department protocols, POLITIFACT (Oct. 30, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/
truth-o-meter/statements/2016/oct/30/robby-mook/clinton-campaign-says-comey-letter-viola
t es-justic/.
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prosecutors must be indifferent to the broader significance of their
decisions.
For example, prosecutors' decisions also have an impact on
prison conditions and overcrowding. The extent of the prison
population is in part a function of prosecutors' decisions in the
aggregate about whether to prosecute low-level offenses and how
harshly to prosecute more serious offenses. If prosecutors do not
consider the problem of prison overcrowding when they make
charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing decisions, they risk
exacerbating the problem through neglect or indifference. While
prison overcrowding might once have been regarded as a problem
exclusively for prison officials, others in the executive branch, or
legislatures, it now seems obvious that prosecutors need to
formulate understandings and opinions about prison conditions
and overcrowding in order to make informed judgments about how
to exercise their discretion. 49
Prosecutions also implicate social policy that is much more
distantly related to criminal justice. For example, public
corruption prosecutions have implications for how politicians run
for office and how government officials function once in office.
Corruption prosecutions of foreign government officials have
foreign policy implications.50 One might be critical if prosecutors'
explicit purpose is to exert influence in areas of public policy
outside the criminal justice arena. But if prosecutions have
unavoidable impact, indirect if not direct, in areas of social policy,
it seems irresponsible for prosecutors to be indifferent to that
impact-to simply let the chips fall where they may. Historically,
criminal law has been abused and misused for social policy ends,5 1
including, no doubt, by prosecutors who are not self-conscious
49 See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors
Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 680 (2016) (arguing that prosecutors need an
incentive to decrease incarceration numbers); see also Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor's
Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 387, 388 (2016) (arguing that
prosecutors have an ethical duty to reduce incarcerations).
5 See, e.g., Matthew J. Spence, Policy Comment: American Prosecutors as Democracy
Promoters: Prosecuting Corrupt Foreign Officials in U.S. Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1185, 1191
(2005) (proposing procedures to ensure that prosecution of foreign corruption does not
adversely affect foreign policy).
51 See generally RISA L. GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016) (dissecting vagrancy laws and how
challenges to them impacted social movements during the 1960s).
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about their role. Prosecutions will always affect broader ends, for
better or worse. If so, the question for prosecutors is how to take
account of social policy in a wise manner when prosecution
decisions have broad social impacts.
Further, from a separation-of-powers perspective, there is
nothing wrong with taking account of broader social policy in
making prosecution decisions. Prosecutors are not exercising
power that they do not have, but instead are exercising their
authority to prosecute or decline to prosecute in light of all of the
relevant public interests, not just criminal justice interests. This
is not to say that prosecutors have carte blanche to implement all
of their views on questions of public policy or to do so in any way
they wish. It is illegitimate for prosecutors to use the power of the
criminal justice system to achieve entirely civil ends. For example,'
a prosecutor could not undertake a grand jury investigation solely
for the purpose of gathering evidence to be used by a civil
government agency. 52 But it is entirely legitimate to temper the
use of criminal authority based on considerations of public policy-
for example, to conclude that drug use should be addressed by
other agencies as a mental health problem rather than by the
prosecutor's office as a criminal justice problem.
It would be artificial for a prosecutor, as a public official, to look
at only one narrow set of public interests and policies, rather than
considering how to resolve the various potentially-conflicting
public interests that come together in a criminal case. Prosecutors
represent the public-the "state," the "government," or the
people-and the public has a multiplicity of interests that are
implicated in a criminal case. 53 It would be a public disservice and
possibly an injustice to elevate one set of interests-the criminal
justice interests-and ignore the others. The public trusts the
prosecutor to decide how to exercise criminal power, but not
necessarily in a small-minded way. In a system of checks and
balances, the prudent exercise of discretion by prosecutors as
members of the executive branch can serve as a check on bad
legislative decisions. 54
52 United States v. Sells Eng'g, 463 U.S. 418, 432-23 (1983).
53 Green, supra note 36, at 613.
54 Green & Zacharias, supra note 37, at 873-74.
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The legality and efficacy of police stop-and-frisk policies may
matter to prosecutors' decision making precisely because
prosecutors' response-or failure to respond-in individual cases
may have an indirect impact on police practices that progressive
prosecutors consider to be undesirable. While New York City
prosecutors, in staying sidelined, may have conceived of
themselves as adopting a neutral position among disputants while
continuing to serve their traditional function of processing cases,
the police and the public might have viewed their silence
differently. With the exception of the Bronx prosecutor, New
York's prosecutors appeared to accept police stop-and-frisk
practices unquestionably.55 By prosecuting cases that began with
a stop or frisk and defending police conduct when challenged by a
suppression motion, prosecutors tacitly approved and encouraged
questionable policing practices. To be sure, it would have been
difficult for prosecutors to decline viable criminal cases or to refuse
to defend police conduct as a way to express disapproval. Doing so
would place prosecutors squarely in the center of a debate that
they sought to stay out of. The public might not understand why
prosecutors refused to "do their job," particularly given that the
unresolved question of the lawfulness of police policy was in the
process of being adjudicated in a federal civil class action lawsuit.
But progressive prosecutors might have sought some other way to
express disapproval, so that their routine treatment of criminal
cases initiated by a stop-and-frisk would not be construed as tacit
support for questionable police practices.
IV. BROADER CONCEPTS OF THE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE AND THE
RELEVANCE OF PUBLIC POLICY
So far, this Essay has examined prosecutors' traditional case-
processing function; whether prosecutors serving in that role may
or must legitimately form views on questions of social policy; and if
so, whether social-policy views about police stop-and-frisk
practices in particular may be relevant to how urban prosecutors
process cases. The Essay now turns to additional conceptions of
the prosecutor's role. Most or all commentators would agree that
55 See supra pp. 1186-1187.
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prosecutors' core function is to process criminal cases, but some
would say that this is not prosecutors' exclusive function. This
Part considers three other roles: as advisor to the police, as
criminal law reformer, and as social problem solver. It suggests
that prosecutors may conceivably respond to questionable stop-
and-frisk practices in any or all of these roles.
A. PROSECUTORS AS ADVISORS TO THE POLICE
In some jurisdictions, prosecutors serve as legal advisors to the
police. The ABA Criminal Justice Standards instruct that
prosecutors "may provide independent legal advice to law
enforcement ... about law enforcement practices in general," 56
that they "should promote compliance by law enforcement
personnel with applicable legal rules, including rules against
improper bias,"57 and that they "should meet and confer regularly
with law enforcement agencies regarding ... law enforcement
policies."5 8
This suggests that, at the very least, a district attorney who
concludes that stop-and-frisk practices are illegal, biased, or
simply unwise, should express this view privately to
representatives of the police department. Of course, the police
department might simply ignore the prosecutor's concerns. In
New York City, it is uncertain whether prosecutors shared private
concerns with the police, but if so, the police were unmoved, and
unsurprisingly so. The policing policy was developed at the
highest level by experienced, sophisticated police personnel. The
police department had access to legal advice about the policy from
the police department's in-house counsel and the city's law
department who publicly supported the policies in the face of
criticism from other government agencies, not-for-profits,
community groups, and some in the media.59 In this context, it is
hard to imagine that prosecutors' private misgivings would
dampen the police enthusiasm.
6 AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 3-3.2(b) (4th ed., 2015).
57 Id. at 3-3.2(c).
68 Id. at 3-3.2(d).
59 See supra pp. 1184-1186 (discussing arguments for and against the policies).
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B. PROSECUTORS' ROLE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE LAW REFORM
There is a growing professional consensus that, beyond
processing individual cases, prosecutors also have a responsibility
to try to improve the laws and processes relating to criminal
justice, drawing on their experience and expertise. This
responsibility, which reflects prosecutors' status both as lawyers
and as public officials, is expressed in the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards, which note:
The prosecutor is not merely a case-processor but also
a problem-solver responsible for considering broad
goals of the criminal justice system. The prosecutor
should seek to reform and improve the administration
of criminal justice, and when inadequacies or
injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to
the prosecutor's attention, the prosecutor should
stimulate and support efforts for remedial action.60
In this role, it is not uncommon for prosecutors to testify or
otherwise advocate for or against proposed criminal-justice
legislation or to submit amicus briefs on criminal justice
questions-work undertaken outside the context of individual
investigations and prosecutions.61
As the ABA Standard reflects, the expectation is that
prosecutors will not seek to influence the law solely to advantage
themselves and their offices-e.g., to expand their power or to
make their work easier-but will seek to redress "inadequacies
and injustice."62 That is, prosecutors will act in the public interest,
consistent with the traditional understanding that their broad
responsibility is to seek justice.
6o See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 3-1.2(f).
61 See, e.g., Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. & Mike Feuer, Don't let gun lobbies go on offense: Column,
USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2017, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/02/14/gun-lobby-nr
a-mental-illness-ssa-column/97823180/ (discussing a bipartisan coalition advancing
prosecutorial and policy solutions); see generally Bruce A. Green, Gideon's Amici: Why Do
Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of the Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336 (2013) (arguing
that prosecutors should argue in favor of the defendant when doing so would promote
justice).
62 See supra note 60.
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In their law-reform role, New York's district attorneys speak
publicly about many issues of criminal law enforcement and weigh
in on potential legislation. One might have expected them to voice
their concern about the city's stop-and-frisk policy if they thought
it was unwise. Of course, one can imagine why the prosecutors
might have preferred to keep their concerns to themselves,
including that taking a position contrary to the police department
might have undermined their relationship with the police and the
mayoral administration. But all the same, given the public image
of fearlessness that prosecutors conventionally cultivate, one
might have expected them to be unafraid to speak their minds.
The district attorneys' silence may have been justified if they
concluded that stop-and-frisk practices, when used to deter and
control rather than investigate crime, were not relevant to the
administration of criminal justice-that even though these police
activities sometimes lead to arrests, they are beyond prosecutors'
authority and expertise because they are not explicitly intended
for investigative purposes. But this seems unlikely. To be sure,
the police might maintain that prosecutors do not know what is
happening on the street, what is necessary to keep the streets and
police safe, and how stop-and-frisk fits in with broader policing
policies-that policing is distinct from "criminal justice." But
prosecutors are the chief elected criminal law enforcement officers,
and they address issues of policing on a regular basis. In
particular, they address the legality of stops and frisks more
frequently than any other government lawyers. Just as elected
prosecutors would be qualified to advise police privately about the
legality of their policing practices, they would be qualified to take
a public stance on the efficacy of these practices-at least as well
qualified as the mayor, a city council member, or any number of
other public officials who weighed in.
C. COMMUNITY PROSECUTING
In recent years, prosecutors have become unapologetic about
using their authority to address social problems, based on a
conception of their role that goes beyond reactively processing
criminal cases that are brought to them. The contemporary
approach involves the use of prosecution as just one part of a
holistic, collaborative, proactive problem-solving strategy to
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address criminal problems that are interconnected with other
social problems-for example, working with other social agencies
and community institutions to address drug abuse through a
combination of drug education, treatment, and prosecution.63
Among the labels given to this conception of prosecuting is
''community prosecuting," based on the analogous concept of
"community policing."64
A premise of "community prosecuting" is that using criminal
justice authority to achieve objectives that implicate not only
criminal justice but other societal interests is not only appropriate
but desirable, as long as the authority is used lawfully.
Community prosecuting enlarges the prosecutor's role,
emphasizing and calling attention to the prosecutor's
status as a public official, as opposed to merely a
courtroom lawyer or advocate for the state in criminal
adjudication. The community prosecutor is more like
the mayor than the public's criminal trial lawyer.
Community prosecuting takes the prosecutor not only
outside the courthouse but outside the conventional
"administrative" role of processing individual cases.
The prosecutor's object of concern goes beyond criminal
justice. The prosecutor may deal with vagrancy,
drawing graffiti on private and public property, and
drug use not as criminal problems but as social issues,
as might officials of departments of homelessness,
sanitation, and public health. This typically requires
the adoption of proactive policies as distinguished from
ad hoc reactions to individual cases. 65
On this conception, considerations of social policy are not
simply incidental to prosecutors' work. Prosecutors can and
should take account of a broad range of social policy considerations
that bear on their work.66 For example, on the most general level,
63 Coles, supra note 35, at 188.
6 Id. at 191-97.
65 Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor: Questions of
Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 293 (2012).
6 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Milwaukee Experiment, NEW YORKER, May 11, 2015, at
24, 26 (crediting Milwaukee prosecutor John Chisholm for recognizing "that prosecutors
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an urban prosecutor developing charging policies would be
expected to take account of considerations of racial and economic
justice, no less than criminal justice, given the disproportionate
impact of the criminal law on minorities and low-income
individuals.67
To the extent that a New York City district attorney endorsed
the concept of community prosecuting, the prosecutor should have
found the police department's stop-and-frisk practices disturbing.
The success of community prosecuting depends on building
constructive relationships with the community and collaborating
with institutions within the community to address criminal-law-
related problems. The police department's excessive use of stop-
and-frisk to deter, not investigate, crime, would have undermined
prosecutors' efforts to engender community trust in, and
collaboration with, law enforcement. This is true regardless of
how the District Court might ultimately rule on the legal
questions before it.
Indeed, prosecutors might have perceived that the policing
policy undermined their office's core function of prosecuting
serious criminal cases. Community confidence in law enforcement
makes it easier for prosecutors to do their job. If witnesses in the
community trust law enforcement, they are more likely to come
forward to assist in investigations and prosecutions, and
community members on the jury are more likely to credit law
enforcement witnesses and have confidence in the prosecution's
presentations at trial. Prosecutors in New York City might have
concluded, as did others, that the prevailing stop-and-frisk
practices eroded community trust to the detriment of conventional
prosecutions.
For reasons already described, it might have been unproductive
or counter-productive for prosecutors to respond by declining to
use evidence obtained from stops and frisks or by declining to
prosecute cases that arose out of stops and frisks. But the concept
of community prosecuting itself suggests at least an initial
should .. . be judged by their success in reducing mass incarceration and achieving racial
equality").
67 See, e.g., K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an
Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 286 (2014) (describing
the racial disparities that arise due to policing in poor urban neighborhoods of color).
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response: prosecutors could have met with community leaders,
expressed their concern about police practices, and sought the
community's advice about how best to respond. Suggestions may
have arisen for contributions that prosecutors could make in
collaboration with other institutions of the community to reduce
what the District Court described as "the human toll of
unconstitutional stops." 68  If nothing else, prosecutors' public
acknowledgement of their concern and the attempt to find a useful
response may have promoted trust in the prosecution, if not in the
police, had some influence in the ongoing public debate over stop-
and-frisk practices, and perhaps even had some influence over the
city's decision whether to continue to defend the policy.
V. CONCLUSION
An elected prosecutor in New York City or any other city in the
United States is not just a lawyer performing the ministerial or
lawyerly task of prosecuting cases brought to the prosecutor's
office by the police. The prosecutor is an important public official.
Both Thomas Dewey and Earl Warren, among others, used their
position as elected prosecutor as a springboard to the state
governorship.
To do their job well in the twenty-first century, prosecutors
have to do more than "follow the evidence." Even if one views the
job as simply processing criminal cases, prosecutors cannot make
decisions in social isolation. They have to take account not only of
criminal justice policy but of broader social policy, both because
social policy has implications for discretionary decision making
about questions of deterrence and retribution in individual
criminal cases and because discretionary decisions in individual
criminal cases have broader social consequences. But urban
prosecutors increasingly, and justifiably, view their work as
involving additional functions-advising the police, seeking to
improve the law and legal processes relating to criminal justice to
make them fairer, and working with the community to address
social problems that implicate criminal law.
68 See supra note 28.
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It is important to inject some realism into contemporary
discussions about prosecutors and their role. The idea that a
lawyer can make important legal decisions mechanically based
solely on the facts and the law, without regard to professional
views of social policy, is as unrealistic for prosecutors as for judges.
While this fiction may sometimes be useful to deflect public
criticism or mistrust of prosecutors' decisions, it is not necessary
for the legitimacy of prosecution. It may be that, in an ideal world,
judges would put aside their own social policy preferences. But we
should want prosecutors to take account of social policy, whether
or not they choose to function as community prosecutors or solely
as case processors. This is not to say that the public will always
agree with prosecutors' public policy preferences and how
prosecutors implement them. Sometimes, observers will conclude,
prosecutors make bad judgments regarding social policy. But it
would be worse for prosecutors to attempt or pretend to ignore the
larger social context in which they work.
Even so, when it comes to matters that bear only indirectly on
prosecutors' work, as is true of stop-and-frisk practices that do not
eventuate in arrests, one might ask what prosecutors have to offer.
In New York City, for example, the legality of the policing policy
was put before a federal court, and the wisdom of the practice was
debated by the city, the police department, the police union, civil
rights organizations, criminal defense representatives, community
groups, and editorialists, among others. Given the multitude of
voices raised and views expressed, it may not be immediately
obvious why prosecutors should add their own.
A possible answer is that prosecutors could have played a
different role-namely, as intermediary, mediator, or "honest
broker" among groups and individuals with differing perspectives.
The question of how to implement stop-and-frisk implicates a host
of interests-the interest in maintaining adherence to the rule of
law by both civilians and public officers, the interests in public and
police safety, the interests in individual autonomy, privacy and
mobility, the interest in nondiscriminatory treatment by public
agencies and officers, and maintaining public confidence in
government institutions, among others. Precisely because
prosecutors' work would not be directly affected by how these
interests were resolved, they had the capacity to see the big
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picture in a somewhat detached way and to serve as neutral
brokers among those who might tend to overvalue particular
interests. The resolution of the class action lawsuits in New York
City included the appointment of a mediator to bring the
stakeholders to the table to seek to craft a new stop-and-frisk
policy that would strike an appropriate balance among the various
interests. 69 But the path to mediation was protracted, contentious
and expensive. It is conceivable that, at an earlier point, a
problem-solving district attorney who had earned the trust of the
community and the police might have stepped in and offered to try
to broker an agreement between the relevant stakeholders.
Perhaps none of the city's elected prosecutors fit the bill at the
time. But, as similar criminal process-related questions arise in
the future, urban prosecutors might consider whether they can
usefully serve this additional function.
69 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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